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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VAUGHN RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah
corporation, THE EQUITABLE
LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF
THE UNITED STATES, a New
York Corporation, and
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a
Maryland joint venture, dba
Crossroads Plaza Associates,

No. 20512
and
No. 20755

Defendants/Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant Vaughn Rasmussen ("Rasmussen") submits the
following reply to the briefs of Respondents Deseret Federal
Savings S Loan Association ("Deseret Federal") and Crossroads
Plaza Associates ("Crossroads").
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INTRODUCTION
Rasmussen claims in this case that Deseret Federal and
Crossroads breached their agreement with him under which
Deseret Federal agreed to release to Rasmussen a portion of its
leased space at Level One of Crossroads Plaza and Crossroads in
turn agreed to relet that space to Rasmussen.

The lower court

granted summary judgment in favor of Crossroads and Deseret
Federal on the basis of the statute of frauds.

The lower court

also granted summary judgment on Crossroads' counterclaim that
Rasmussen is liable for unpaid rent.
This reply first addresses the arguments of both Crossroads
and Deseret Federal that (1) their acts and conduct do not give
rise to the application of promissory estoppel to prevent their
reliance on the statute of frauds; (2) there were insufficient
memoranda of the parties' agreement to satisfy the statute of
frauds; and (3) Rasmussen's acts and conduct in reliance on the
promises of Crossroads and Deseret Federal are insufficient
performance to satisfy the statute of frauds.

As shown below,

there remain issues of fact as to whether promissory estoppel,
memoranda of the parties, or Rasmussen's part performance
satisfies the statute of frauds.
The final section of the brief addresses Crossroads' argument that the lower court correctly granted summary judgment on
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its counterclaim for unpaid rent.

As shown below, there remain

issues of fact relating to the counterclaim as well.
The lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
respondents must be reviewed in light of the following standard
announced by this Court:
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, and the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the loser, must show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact.
Heath Techna Corp. v. Zions First National Bank, 609 P.2d 1334,
1336 (Utah 1980).

Viewing the facts of record in the light

most favorable to Rasmussen, the lower court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of respondents on both Rasmussen's claims and
Crossroads' counterclaim must be reversed.
POINT I
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN CONCERNING THE ISSUE
OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.
The issue before the court is whether promissory estoppel
bars application of the statute of frauds with respect to the
agreement of the parties under which Deseret Federal agreed to
release certain space on Level One of Crossroads Plaza to
Rasmussen and Crossroads agreed to relet that space to
Rasmussen.

Both respondents cite McKinnon v. Corporation of

the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day

-3-

Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974), for the proposition
that promissory estoppel does not bar application of the
statute of frauds unless "[t]he acts and conduct of the
promisor . . . so clearly manifest an intention that he will
not assert the statute that to permit him to do so would be to
work a fraud upon the other party."

Rasmussen recognizes that

in order for him to prevail on the estoppel issue, there must
be genuine issues of material fact under that standard.
Here, there is no question but that fact issues remain as
to whether respondents' acts and conduct induced Rasmussen to
act and manifested that they did not intend to assert statute
of frauds.

It is undisputed that Deseret Federal, by its

January 13, 1983, letter (R

175, Exhibit 2), appointed

Crossroads its agent to consummate the agreement the parties
had reached concerning the lease of Level One space to
Rasmussen.

(See Deseret Federal Brief at p. 13.) After

receipt of that letter, Bruce Barcal, acting as agent for both
Crossroads and Deseret Federal, repeatedly represented to
Rasmussen that the lease documents would be forthcoming and
everything was in order.
31).

R. 158, 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at 26,

Barcal also assured Rasmussen that he could proceed with

financing, remodeling plans, and purchase of inventory in
reliance on the parties' agreement and Rasmussen did so in
reliance on those assurances.

R. 157-158.
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In February, 1983,

Barcal told Rasmussen that the leases were coming by Federal
Express on two separate occasions.
45).

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at

Later, in a letter dated March 9, 1983, Barcal advised

Deseret Federal and Rasmussen that a lease surrender form and
leases would arrive in approximately five business days.
161.

R.

Barcal*s promises of forthcoming lease documents and

repeated assurances that he could take action in reliance on
those promises, which are not disputed in the record before
this court, raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
Barcal's statements and conduct as agent for both respondents
manifest an intention that respondents would not assert the
statute of frauds and preclude respondents from relying on the
statute.
Deseret Federal's argument that promissory estoppel was not
raised in the court below is without merit.

The elements of

estoppel were all set forth in Rasmussen's Complaint.

R. 2-7.

POINT II
THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM TO SATISFY
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Both respondents dispute that the documents relied on by
Rasmussen constitute sufficient memoranda to satisfy the
statute of frauds.

In making that determination, the court

should consider the documents together along with parol
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evidence relating to them.

Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548,

549-50 (Utah 1979).
The letter of January 13, 1983, from Howard Swapp of
Deseret Federal to Bruce Barcal (Crossroads' agent), clearly
manifests Deseret Federal's agreement to release the subject
space.

R. 175, Exhibit 2.

The reference in the agreement to

negotiation of a proposal clearly relates to the past; the
letter is a manifestation that as between Deseret Federal and
Rasmussen an agreement had been reached as set out in the
letter.

The March 9, 1983, letter from Bruce Barcal to Bruce

Cundick of Deseret Federal evidences Crossroads' agreement
(which had been reached initially in August 1982) to release
Deseret Federal from its lease of the subject space and to
relet the space to Vaughn Rasmussen.

R. 161.

The terms of the

Deseret Federal's agreement to release its space are set forth
in the AGREEMENT it delivered to Rasmussen on March 9, 1983.
R. 175, Exhibit 14. The terms of the lease are all memorialized in the lease documents finally delivered to Rasmussen in
April 1983, and are the same as those agreed to orally in
August 1982.

R. 9-45, 155-159.

The discrepancy between Deseret Federal's January 13, 1983
letter (950 sq. ft.) and Barcal's March 19, 1983 letter (790
sq. ft.) as to the amount of space to be leased is insignificant.

The parties certainly had no question as to the location
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of the space to be leased to Rasmussen and parol evidence would
be admissible to precisely define the exact description of the
space.

Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549-50 (Utah 1979).

Crossroads' brief quotes Rasmussen as acknowledging at his
deposition that whatever documents were generated by Barcal as
leasing agent would have to be approved by the owner.
Crossroads Brief at 17.

Crossroads fails to explain, however,

that at the time that testimony was given it was in the context
of a discussion of meetings with Barcal in July 1982 before an
agreement with Crossroads was reached.
at 26-27).

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo.

Crossroads omits Rasmussen*s testimony that later

"Mr. Barcal assured both me and Mr. Matheson on various occasions that the lease and everything was in order and that we
could proceed with our loan, inventory and plans."

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. at 28). Rasmussen added that as of December
1982 Barcal "had said previously on many occasions that everything was in order - the landlord had approved the terms of the
lease."

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at 31).

The failure of the lease to finally be signed was due to
Barcal's failure, as agent for both parties, to timely deliver
the lease documents to Rasmussen.

After March 15, Barcal

finally provided the lease, but by that time Deseret Federal
would agree only to a sublease, which was unacceptable to
Crossroads.

R. 46-50.
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In sum, Rasmussen innocently took actions to his detriment
as a result of written manifestations of agreements made by
both Deseret Federal and Crossroads, as well as the promises
continually made to him by their agent Bruce Barcal.
dents unfairly whipsawed Rasmussen.
perform as promised.

Respon-

Both of them failed to

Certainly questions of fact exist in this

case as to whether the documents referred to and relied on by
Rasmussen constitute sufficient memoranda to satisfy the statute of frauds.

Failure to so find would result in the statute

of frauds being used to perpetrate a fraud against Rasmussen.
POINT III
RASMUSSEN1S PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE
PARTIES' AGREEMENT SATISFIES THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
Both respondents also dispute that Rasmussen's part performance satisfies the statute of frauds.

As shown in Rasmussen's

opening brief, the doctrine of part performance is satisfied
when the following standard is met:
First, the oral contract must be clear and definite;
second, the acts done in performance of the contract
must be equally clear and definite; and third, the
acts must be in reliance on the contract.
Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983).

The doctrine

of part performance, as its name indicates, requires only partial performance of the parties' agreement, not full performance as maintained by Deseret Federal,
§ 25-5-8.
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id.; Utah Code Ann.

The parties1 agreement contemplated, among other things,
that Rasmussen obtain plans for remodeling of the subject space
and obtain funds sufficient to accomplish the remodeling.

R.

156, 175 (Rasmussen Depo., Ex. 14). At a bare minimum,
Rasmussen performed in accordance with those conditions by
obtaining plans for remodeling and obtaining an SBA loan to
provide sufficient funds for the remodeling.

There is no

evidence whatever that Rasmussen undertook those efforts for
any purpose other than to perform under his agreement with
Crossroads and Deseret Federal.

The argument that those acts

were merely preparatory acts and are not exclusively referrable
to the performance of the oral lease agreement is specious; as
the agreement Deseret Federal delivered to Vaughn Rasmussen in
March of 1983 indicates, those acts went to the essence of the
parties' agreement.

Crossroads' suggestion in its brief at

p. 18 that Rasmussen's obtaining plans and incurring remodeling
expenses were equally consistent with Rasmussen's obtaining a
sublease from Deseret Federal might make sense except that when
those acts were performed there had been no discussion of any
agreement but the agreement to lease from Crossroads; the
sublease proposal was made after March 15, 1983, following
Barcal's failure on behalf of both respondents to timely
deliver the leases.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at 65-66).

In any

event, there exist questions of fact as to the precise terms
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of the agreement and whether Rasmussen's acts constituted part
performance of those terms.
POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CROSSROADS' COUNTERCLAIM
WAS IMPROPER.
The court below granted Crossroads' summary judgment for
unpaid rent over the unrefuted affidavit of Vaughn Rasmussen
stating facts showing fraud in the inducement of the subject
lease.

Crossroads argues that summary judgment was proper

because (1) Rasmussen*s reply to its counterclaim raising the
fraud defense was untimely; (2) Rasmussen waived the right to
raise the defense; and (3) the statute of limitations bars the
defense.

None of these arguments is meritorious.

Crossroads cites not a single authority for the proposition
that the delay in submission of a reply to a counterclaim
results in a waiver of the defenses raised in th€» reply.

As

required by the rules, Rasmussen raised the defense of fraud in
his reply to Crossroads' counterclaim.

Even if he had not,

under the liberal policy of the rules of procedure, Rasmussen
should have been entitled to amend his original pleading to
assert the defense, and even to amend his pleadings to raise
the defense following trial to conform with the evidence.
15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
notice.

Crossroads was put on

There is simply no basis for finding a waiver.
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Rule

Crossroads would have this court in effect grant it a default
judgment without it having timely taken any action to obtain
one.

See Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is simply

too late for Crossroads to complain at this stage.
With respect to the issue of waiver, Crossroads has the
burden of showing that Rasmussen intentionally relinquished its
right to raise the defense.

Such requires Crossroads to offer

proof of that Rasmussen, after obtaining knowledge of the
fraud, continued to perform or otherwise ratify the contract.
Crossroads has failed to furnish such evidence.
Moreover, as in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247, "[i]t
is only when there is a new agreement between the parties,
after discovery of the fraud, the court may find a waiver of
the fraud action [for damages]."
ment in this case.

There is no such new agree-

Hence, Rasmussen's affirmative defense of

set-off, being in substance a claim for damages, cannot have
been waived.
Crossroads contends Rasmussen*s pleading is deficient for
failure to allege that he commenced performance prior to discovery of the fraud.

Rasmussen's fraud claim is raised by way

of affirmative defense.

Under normal rules of pleading, all

that is required is a short and plain statement of the defense,
rather than the detailed statement required when a claim is
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made affirmatively.
Procedure.

See, Rule 8(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Rasmussen's defense is adequately pleaded.

Crossroads' final argument is that Rasmussen's fraud
defense is barred by the statute of limitations.

However, the

statute of limitations, by its own terms, applies only to the
maintenance of actions, not defenses.
78-12-26(3).

Utah Code Ann.

The general rule concerning application of

statutes of limitation to matters of defense is as follows:
The ultimate purpose of a limitations lies to bar
actions rather than to suppress or deny matters of
defense. Hence, as a gcmeral rule, limitation statutes are not applicable to defenses, but apply only
where affirmative relief is sought.
51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 76 (1970).

The numer-

ous cases cited in Rasmussen's opening brief are to the same
effect.
Moreover, in Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Utah
1985), this court stated that a counterclaim could be set-off
against the plaintiff's claim notwithstanding the statute of
limitations.

Even if Crossroads is correct that for the

statute of limitations not to apply to Rasmussen's fraud claim
for set-off, his claim must not have been time-barred at the
time Crossroads' claim arose, Crossroads has failed to offer
any proof as to when Rasmussen discovered the fraud.

There-

fore, there is no basis for determining whether or not the
claims of Rasmussen and Crossroads at some point overlapped.
Summary judgment, therefore, was improper.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, fact issues remain both with
respect to Rasmussen's claims against Crossroads and Deseret
Federal, and also with respect to Crossroads' claim for unpaid
rent against Rasmussen.

The lower court's grant of summary

judgment to Crossroads and Deseret Federal should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^IfL

day of January, 1986.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Rex E.' Madsen
Stephen J. Hill
John R. Lund
Attorneys for Appellant
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